Book proposal

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1 The aim of the book

The aim of this book is to provide an advanced and systematic (rather than author-centred) introduction to the philosophical debates surrounding the imagination. Imagining has often played second fiddle to other mental phenomena, such as perceiving or believing. But especially in the last twenty years or so, philosophers have more and more come to recognise that this should not be so and, as a consequence, have started to shift their attention to the imagination.

However, there is yet no established debate about the imagination (as there is, say, about perception), but instead only many smaller debates about particular aspects of the imagination, and with fairly limited interactions and overlaps. Relatedly, the focus is still mainly on issues and positions restricted to specific topics, rather than on more general questions and proposals. This will be reflected in the structure of the proposed book in that it will emphasise a variety of central issues concerning the imagination, instead of a single big issue.

The upsurge of interest in the imagination has been closely accompanied by the acknowledgement that imagining is of considerable significance for certain classical debates in philosophy, such as those concerning our acquisition of modal knowledge or knowledge about

other minds, the nature of perceptual experience, or our perception of artistic representation and expression. Accordingly, one important focus in the recent literature has been on the discussion of the role of imagining in the respective complex mental phenomena, and of how reference to the imagination may help us to get clearer about, or even solve, the related philosophical problems.

This utilisation of the philosophy of the imagination for other philosophical areas has helped to stimulate the respective debates. But it has also highlighted the need for a proper account of the nature of the forms of imagining involved, thus linking the interest in the role of imagining for other mental phenomena with an interest in how the former differs from the latter. Thus, the second emphasis in the contemporary debates has been on the nature of particular forms of imagining. Imagining comes in a variety of different forms (e.g., visualising, supposing or daydreaming); and many of them have given rise to extensive discussions of their nature, also in comparison with the corresponding non-imaginative phenomena (e.g., perception or belief).

The proposed book will cover the main views on the nature and the significance of imagining. On the one hand, it will consider the main metaphysical theories of specific forms of imagining — such as the perceptual, the pictorial, the intentional, the experiential and the agency view on visualising, or the corresponding approaches to belief- and desire-like imagining. On the other hand, it will critically discuss the main attempts to explain other important phenomena — such as the ones listed above — by reference to the imagination. The aim is to show how both aspects of the debate can, and do, inform each other — the nature of the imagination determines its contribution to other mental phenomena, and the usefulness of the imagination reveals its nature.

A closely related third issue — namely what, if anything, unifies the various forms and uses of imagining — is less often raised in the literature. Indeed, this omission has rendered the contemporary debate on the imagination somewhat compartmentalised and disunified. I will therefore conclude the book with a discussion of several possible answers to the question of whether the different forms of imagining possess a common nature, and with the suggestion that what characterises imagining in general is its status as a special kind of mental agency.

2 The structure of the book

In accordance with the two identified foci of interest in the literature and the intimately linked issue of unity, the book will be organised around three questions:

(a) What is the nature of particular forms of imagining (e.g., visualising)?
(b) Which philosophically interesting mental phenomena involve, and can be elucidated in terms of, imagining?
(c) What unifies the various forms of imagining?

In the first chapter, I will set up the three questions and make some general remarks on how they are addressed by different views on the imagination. Then, I will spent two chapters on question (a) by examining the main accounts of the nature of objectual and propositional forms of imagining, with a specific focus on visualising and belief-like imagining. The two following chapters will be devoted to question (b) by discussing the proposed role of imagining in various debates in epistemology and aesthetics, many of which overlap with respective debates in the philosophy of mind. The final chapter will address question (c) and defend the view that imagining is fundamentally an instance of mental agency and contrast it with alternative views on the unity of imagining.

These six chapters are framed by an introductory and a concluding chapter which, respectively present the structure of the book, summarise the main results of the book and point to possible future developments in the debates on the imagination. The resulting table of contents will be as follows (the estimated word counts are meant to give a rough impression of the anticipated differences in length among the chapters):

Introduction (about 4.000 words)
1. Episodic vs. Projective Imagining (about 10.000 words)
2. Objectual Imagining (about 16.000 words)
3. Propositional Imagining (about 13.000 words)
4. Applications in Epistemology (about 13.000 words)
5. Applications in Aesthetics (about 13.000 words)
6. The Unity of Imagining (about 7.000 words)
Conclusion (about 4.000 words)

The philosophical discussions of the imagination during the last hundred years or so have largely centred on the manifestations of the imagination on the personal level; and I will follow them in this. This means that I will not devote much space to four other aspects of the imagination worthy of investigation: (i) the subpersonal architecture and realisation of imagining on the personal level; (ii) imaginativeness as a character trait, or as an aspect of originality and creativity of people, artworks, and so on; (iii) the imagination as a faculty or capacity to imagine, to unite sense impressions in perception, to create art, and so on; and (iv) the relationship between imagining and dreaming. However, when they are relevant for the discussion of conscious imagining and its role in our mental lives, I will address issues surrounding the aspects (i)-(iv) as well.

Relatedly, I chose not to add a specific chapter on the imagination as a topic in the cognitive sciences — partly for reasons of scope, partly because there are already better introductions to some of the main debates than I could offer (cf. Tye (1991) and Thomas (2010) on mental imagery), and partly because of my choice of a more systematic approach, allocating the relevant results from the empirical sciences to the respective chapters or sections on visualising, belief-like and desire-like imagining. But, apart from having to shorten or rearrange some of the other material, it should be unproblematic to add an empirically minded chapter — ideally in between the third and the fourth chapter — if so desired.

3 Chapter summaries

Introduction (about 4.000 words)

In the introduction, I will briefly set out the aim and structure of the book. I will outline the two foci of interest in the recent debate and explain how they have lead to an increased philosophical interest in the imagination in the last twenty years or so. In particular, I will make clear that studying the imagination is philosophically worthwhile not only for its own sake, but also in respect of progress in other debates.

Chapter 1: Episodic vs. projective imagining (about 10.000 words)

The first chapter has the function to introduce the three questions (a), (b) and (c) and to explain how they structure both the debates in the literature and the proposed book. What will thereby be central to the chapter is the basic distinction between single imaginative *episodes* (e.g., the visualisation of a tree or the supposition that it rains) and imaginative *projects*, that is, purposeful and unified complexes of imaginative and possibly other episodes (e.g., the daydream of being rich or the speculation about the consequences of the Earth being flat).

Accordingly, I will begin by spelling out this distinction (including the fact that episodes are characterised by their phenomenal character and their functional role) and show how it relates to the three questions. The discussions addressing question (a) are normally concerned with the nature of *episodic* forms of imagining. By contrast, imagining becomes relevant for other phenomena — and hence for question (b) — typically in the shape of *projective* imagining. Finally, an important aspect of question (c) is the issue of whether mental projects may count as imaginative in the same sense as mental episodes — that is, whether there is also a *unity among episodic and projective imagining.*

The remainder of the chapter is reserved for more specific comments on how the literature on the imagination approaches the topic of the nature of imaginative episodes, and on which distinctions it draws among imaginative projects. Both sets of considerations will be important for the subsequent chapters.

Episodic imagining. Concerning episodic forms of imagining, I will explain that the question (a) about their nature is, primarily, a question about which mental kind they belong to. Moreover, I will describe how their mental kind is usually characterised partly by reference to the mental kind of their non-imaginative counterparts. My discussion will therefore continue with the general observation that each episode of imagining has a possible non-imaginative counterpart (while the opposite may not be true — see the discussion of desire- and emotion-like imagining in chapter 5). What I will highlight is that the counterpart relation concerned involves both symmetric and asymmetric elements. The main symmetric element is that the two types of episode are very similar in their presentational aspects (e.g., both seeing and visualising make us aware of objects and features in a visual manner, while both supposing and judging make us aware of propositions in an intellectual manner). In particular, I will stress that the

distinction between objectual and propositional awareness in non-imaginative cases transfers to the realm of imaginative episodes (cf. Casey (2000), Wollheim (1984, ch. 3), Hopkins (1998, ch. 7), McGinn (2004) and Gaut (2003)). The main asymmetric element is that imaginative episodes are, in one or more ways, dependent on non-imaginative ones and thus should be partly be elucidated in terms of the latter — which explains why accounts of the various forms of imagining contrast them with their non-imaginative counterparts.

I will continue by outlining the three basic ways in it is possible to account for imaginative episodes in relation to their non-imaginative counterparts:

(1) They belong to the same mental kind and differ just in degree.
(2) They belong to different mental kinds and differ in what they make us aware of (i.e., they make us aware of different objects and features, or of different propositions).
(3) They belong to different mental kinds and differ in how they make us aware of the same things (whether these are objects and features, or propositions).

During the discussion, I will highlight that it is neither uncommon, nor implausible to adopt a different approach to different forms of imagining (cf. Peacocke (1985) and Martin (2002)) — a possibility which may be taken to pose a challenge to the idea of a unity of imagining (cf. chapter 6).

I will also note that each of the first two options is inseparably linked to a certain more general picture of the mind — namely an *traditional empiricist* picture of the mind according to which all mental episodes are either experiences or modifications of experiences, such that there is no principle divide between perceptions, thoughts and other mental episodes (cf. Hume (2007), according to one reading); or a *representationalist empiricist* picture according to which all (presentational) mental episodes differ ultimately just in what they are about (Price (1981), Dretske (1995) or Tye (2000)). One common theme throughout the first chapters will be that the case of imagining provides a serious challenge for these versions of empiricism.

The third option is most closely linked to intentionalism about mental states, but I will show that it may also be adopted by proponents of other theories (e.g., disjunctivists about perception). In relation to this, I will briefly discuss several — not necessarily incompatible — ways of understanding the difference in the manner of awareness mentioned in (3):

(3.a) As a difference in the attitude of awareness.
(3.b) As a difference in the immediacy of awareness.
(3.c) As a difference in the voluntariness of awareness.

I will sketch the phenomenological roots (notably in Husserl (2006) and Sartre (2004)) of these views and link each of them to contemporary positions in the philosophy of mind — (3.a) to intentionalism (e.g., Hopkins (1998, ch. 7) or Currie and Ravenscroft (2003)), (3.b) to empiricist (or neo-Humean) views (e.g., Martin (2002, 2001)), and (3.c) to Wittgensteinian views (e.g.,

Scruton (1974) or McGinn (2004)). The resulting map of five broad approaches to imaginative episodes will structure the two subsequent chapters in which I will discuss two particular forms of episodic imagining, visualising and belief-like imagining.

Projective imagining. The discussion of mental projects essentially involving episodes of imagining will be briefer. I will begin with describing how mental projects are made up of mental episodes and unified by their purpose. In particular, I will focus on the projects of imagining being, doing or experiencing something (Peacocke (1985), Walton (1990, ch. 1) and Wollheim (1984, ch. 3)). I will then outline the basic distinctions that have been noted between different imaginative projects (ibid., as well as Goldie (2000, ch. 7)): between imagining something acentrally and centrally/peripherally; the related distinction between imagining from the outside and imagining from the inside; and the distinction among cases of central imagining between imagining being in the situation (or the 'shoes') of another person and imagining having her mental states (i.e., empathizing with her). I will close with a brief discussion of the various ways in which we can imagine something about ourselves, and of the question of what it means to imagine 'being' someone else (cf. Williams (1973, ch. 3), Wollheim (1974, ch. 3), Wollheim (1984, ch. 3) and Velleman (2006, ch. 8)). The question of which projects should count as 'imaginative' will be taken up in the last chapter.

After reading the chapter, students should understand:

- The distinction between episodes and projects, especially applied to imagining
- The distinction between objectual and propositional imagining
- The differences between the three main approaches to the nature of imaginative episodes
- Some of the historical developments of — and relations among — these approaches, in particular in relation to empiricism, phenomenology and Wittgenstein
- The main distinctions among forms of projective imagining

Recommended reading. Wollheim (1984, ch. 3) and Walton (1990, ch. 1) give a good idea of the distinction between episodic and projective imagining. Gaut (2003) and especially Hopkins (1998, ch. 7) describe well the difference between objectual and propositional imagining, and the latter gives also a nice overview of the different possible approaches to imaginative episodes (thereby focussing on visualising). Williams (1973, ch. 3), Wollheim (1984, ch. 3) and Peacocke (1985) are the classic readings on the variety of imaginative projects; while Velleman (2006, ch. 8) discusses the perspectivalness involved in the project of imagining being someone else. For accessible presentations of the empiricist, phenomenological and Wittgensteinian outlooks on imagining, see Stroud (1999, ch. 2), Sartre (2004, especially ch. 1) and Budd (1991, ch. 5), respectively. Crane (2001) and Tye (2000) provide nice introductions to intentionalism and representationalism, respectively. Good overviews of historical treatments of the imagination are to be found in Warnock (1976), White (1990) and Cocking (1991).

Chapter 2: Objectual imagining (about 16.000 words)

This and the next chapter will be devoted to question (a) about the nature of particular forms of imagining — that is, the question of the mental kind which they belong to. In this chapter, I will use the example of visualising to illustrate the five main ways in which it is possible to account for objectual imagining. With respect to each of the approaches to visualising, I will not only elucidate the view and link it to more general considerations about the mind, but also discuss its main strengths and weaknesses. On the go, I will also address the points raised by skeptics about the existence of objectual and sensory forms of imagining (cf. Shorter (1952), White (1990) and Dennett (2010, ch. 7); and the reply by Kind (2001)).

My focus on visualising is motivated by the fact that the literature on object imagining is almost exclusively concerned with visualising as well. In passing, I will discuss other instances of object imagining — notably imagining in other sense modalities (cf. Hopkins (1998, ch. 7) and Stevenson and Case (2005)) and the imaginative counterparts of object-directed emotional feelings and bodily sensations (cf. Moran (1994), Walton (1990), Currie and Ravenscroft (2003) and Martin (2002)). I will make clear that many points and arguments apply to them as well as to visualising, despite some significant differences between the various types of object imagining.

(1) The perceptual view: a difference in degree. First, I will introduce the perceptual view which states that episodes of visualising belong to the same fundamental kind as episodes of seeing, namely that of visual perceptual experience; and that they differ just in degree, namely in their 'vivacity'. I will illustrate that Hume (2007), James (1983) and O'Shaughnessy (2003) are arguably proponents of this view (I will offer an alternative reading further below). And I will also discuss the fact that they and others have understood 'vivacity' in different ways. In particular, episodes of visualising may be taken to be less replete or determinate in their contents; or they may be taken to be less intense or determinate in their non-presentational aspects.

What speaks in favour of the perceptual view is that it shares most of its important properties with seeing (e.g., they both present objects in a visual and perspectival manner, do not involve any evaluative or conative element, and so on); and that it is indeed typically less vivid than seeing in one or more of the described respects. But not only have philosophers (cf. Budd (1991, ch. 5)) noted counterexamples to the generalisation of this typical difference (i.e., there may be very vivid episodes of visualising, and very faint episodes of seeing), there are also important differences in kind between seeing and visualising, which the perceptual view cannot capture. At this point, I plan to highlight the following differences: in functional role (e.g., seeing, but not visualising, inclines and entitles us to belief and guides us in action); in phenomenologically salient commitment (i.e., seeing is non-neutral about reality, while visualising is non-neutral about the imagined scene); in the manner of visual presentation (e.g., seeing, but not visualising, is observational and informative (cf. Sartre (2004, ch. 1) and Hopkins (1998, ch. 7))); and in subjection to the will (cf. the agency view below and chapter 6).

Besides, I will emphasise the not always noticed fact that Hume's own characterisation of vivacity in phenomenal and functional terms — that is, in terms of the involvement of a sense of reality and the impact on belief — indicates a difference in kind, rather than in degree (e.g., a visual experience of a tree either gives rise to the belief that there is a tree, or it does not) and thus threatens to render his overall view incoherent. Interestingly, a similar oscillation between the asumption of a qualitative and of a quantitative difference can be found in the contemporary empiricist and neo-Humean view of O'Shaughnessy (2003). My conclusion will be that even philosophers sympathetic to the strict version of empiricism introduced above have to some extent realised that it reaches its limits when applied to the case of visualising.

(2) The pictorial view: a difference in what is presented. Second, I will consider the pictorial view which claims that, while seeing makes us aware of material objects in the external world, visualising makes us aware of what are, literally speaking, internal depictions of such objects. I will begin my discussion with highlighting the fact that, although the pictorial view has been the target of many discussions and objections (cf. Sartre (2004), Ryle (2009), Dennett (2010), Tye (1991) and McGinn (2004)), it is difficult to find a clear statement of it. Hannay (1971) and Brann (1991) are perhaps clearest about their commitment to internal pictures as our direct objects of awareness when visualising. Tye (1991) identifies Berkeley and Locke as proponents, while another likely proponent is Price (1981). I will also link the pictorial view to Kosslyn's position on the so-called 'imagery debate', but will discuss this view only briefly, mainly for two reasons. On the one hand, there are already good philosophical and psychological introductions to this debate (e.g., Tye (1991) and Thomas (2010)). And, on the other hand, the debate concerns primarily the nature of subpersonal visual representations — which may, moreover, be present in non-imaginative perception and recall as well — rather than that of conscious episodes of visualising. The main link between the two debates to be highlighted is that the nature of the subpersonal representations may be reflected in, or partly explain, the phenomenal character of visualising.

Apart from the problematic adoption of a sense-data view of visual experience, the main motivation for assuming a difference in the presented entities, rather than the manner of their presentation, is the kind of representationalism (and naturalism) noted above. I will explain why representationalists should assume that we visualise and see the same properties (e.g., colours, shapes, textures, and so on), so that they should locate the difference between seeing and visualising in the objects of awareness. Since episodes of visualising present people, chairs, buildings, and so on, and may moreover refer to existing and perceivable objects (cf. Sartre (2004) and Martin (2001)) and enable us to acquire knowledge about them by visual means (cf. Martin (2002) and Williamson (2008)), the visualised objects have to be able to 'stand in' for external objects in the right kind of way — namely in the same way in which pictures 'stand in' for what they depict.

I will also rehearse some traditional objections to the pictorial view, such as: (i) in introspection, we do not find mental pictures over and above the external objects visualised —

but if the mental pictures are taken to be transparent, visualising would not any more differ phenomenologically from seeing; (ii) our awareness of the internal pictures would differ very much from our awareness of external pictures (e.g., in not being perspectival, subject to optimal conditions, and so on); (iii) visualising, but not pictures, may be partly indeterminate about what is presented; (iv) our awareness of a picture (whether external or internal) may already be an instance of imagining (cf. chapter 5). I will close by noting to important consequences of the problematic status of the pictorial view: not only strict representationalism, but also its understanding of the transparency of experience should be rejected (cf. Martin (2002) and Dorsch (2010b)); objection (i) speaks also against views of type (3) — such as Sartre (2004)'s — which liken visualising to pictorial experience, without endorsing the pictorial view and its commitment to internal pictures (cf. Hopkins (1998, ch. 7)).)

(3.a) The intentional view: a difference in the attitude of awareness. Third, I will present the intentional view which maintains that seeing and visualising differ only in their intentional attitude towards the presented objects and features. I will introduce the general intentionalist distinction between attitude and content and list the various ways in which philosophers have tried to spell out the proposed difference in attitude — for instance, in terms of positing objects as either present or non-present (cf. Husserl (2006) and Sartre (2004)), or as either actual or possible (cf. Casey (2000) and White (1990)). In addition, I will link the idea of an imaginative attitude to the idea of a commitment to what is part of the imagined situation (cf. Martin (2002)), as well as to some of the other features of visualising introduced earlier on, such as its non-observationality or its uninformativity.

Within the contemporary debate, the intentional view is the most widespread account of visualising. I will explain that the main factor responsible for this is the recent emergence of intentionalism as the main approach to the mind (e.g., in the debates about perception and thought). And I will highlight the explanatory power of the intentional view — in particular in respect of the visualisability of non-existing entities, and in respect of the similarities and differences between seeing and visualising, as well as between visualising and imagining in other modalities (cf. Hopkins (1998, ch. 7)). But I will also present the main objection against the intentional view, namely that it cannot accommodate the subjective aspect of the perspectivalness of visualising (cf. Peacocke (1985) and Martin (2002); and Williams (1973, ch. 3) and Hopkins (1998, ch. 7) for replies), as well as the subjective aspects of the imaginative counterparts of feeling pains or itches (cf. Martin (2002)). Besides, I will note that Moran (1994)'s attempt to apply the intentional view to emotional imagining faces the problem of making sense of an emotional attitude.

(3.b) The experiential view: a difference in the immedicacy of awareness. Fourth, I will introduce the experiential view which states that we visualise objects by imagining seeing them (i.e., that objectual imagining involves, or amounts to, experiential imagining; cf. Peacocke (1985) and Martin (2002, 2001)). Since this issue is not very often explicitly discussed in the

literature, I will spend some time on spelling out what this actually means — namely that visualising something requires imagining (or re-presenting) what it would be like to see it; and I will discuss in which sense imagining an experience of something is still an instance of objectual imagining — the analogy with the photographic reproduction of paintings of objects will thereby become important (cf. Dorsch (2010b)). It will thereby become clear that, according to a plausible reading of their texts, both Hume (2007) and O'Shaughnessy (2003) can be understood as proponents of the experiential view, so that it presents for empiricists a live alternative to the perceptual view. It will also be helpful to spell out the different takes of the intentional and the experiential view on projects centred around visualising something.

As part of the discussion of the merits of the experiential view, I will note that, although the experiential view is perhaps most naturally linked to empiricist and disjunctive approaches to the mind, it has also been adopted by other philosophers, such as intentionalists about perceptual experience with a rationalist outlook (e.g., Peacocke (1985)). Among the reasons for endorsing the experiential view are the considerations about perspective mentioned above, and more general considerations about the differences in phenomenal character between seeing, visually recalling and visualising (cf. Martin (2001)). I will also list the main objections raised against the experiential view — that it is true only of forms of objectual imagining which are counterparts of subjective presentational episodes (e.g., feelings of pain); that it ignores the possibility to imagine just an object; that visualising does not require the possession of any concepts of visual experience; that the idea of imagining (or representing) an experience remains mysterious (cf. Burge (2005), Noordhof (2002), Hopkins (1998, ch. 7), and Currie and Ravenscroft (2003)) — and illustrate how some of them miss their target, while others seem to be less pressing than perhaps thought (cf. Dorsch (2010b)).

(3.c) The agency view: a difference in the voluntariness of awareness. Fifth, I will discuss the agency view which treats visualising as an instance of mental agency. First of all, I will point out that, while most writers on visualising have noted its subjection to the will, not many have taken it to be their defining feature (exceptions are philosophers in the tradition of Wittgenstein, such as Scruton (1974), McGinn (2004) or Dorsch (2009, 2011)).

In particular, I will distinguish the agency view from the weaker — and relatively uncontroversial and uninteresting — claim that visualising is sometimes, or 'in principle', subject to the will. What matters here is the distinction between being an instance of agency and being a product of agency (e.g., the raised position of our arm is sometimes willed and sometimes not, but only our raising of our arm is an action, that is, essentially willed). Similarly, it will helpful to point out that the agency view should not be confused with the view that visualising is a 'spontaneous' product of our minds, rather than a causal effect of the world, given that 'spontaneity' in this Kantian sense is compatible with involuntariness and, moreover, pertains to perceptions as well (cf. Sartre (2004) and Collingwood (1958)).

Next, it will be necessary to specify the kind of mental agency with which visualising is identified — namely mental agency which involves considerable control over what is presented

(cf. McGinn (2004) and Dorsch (2009, 2011)). As I will note, the resulting view is neutral on whether visualising is intentional (e.g., with an 'attitude' of voluntariness) or instead an instance of experiential imagining (e.g., with the idea to treat visual recall in contrast as a passive form of representing an episode of seeing). Finally, I will contrast the agency view with another view that focusses on the active nature of imagining — namely Ryle (2009)'s account of visualising as pretending to see. As part of this contrast, I will briefly note the implausibility of Ryle's proposal as an account of visualising understood as a purely mental phenomena (cf. White (1990) and Currie and Ravenscroft (2003)).

What speaks in favour of the agency view is not only the promise of a unified account of imagining (cf. chapter 6), but also its power to explain certain important features of visualising, notably: (i) that it is indeed subject to the will; (ii) that its reference is fixed by our thoughts or intentions in a special way (cf. Wittgenstein (1970, section 68) and Peacocke (1985) on the immunity to error with respect to the identifcation of what we visualise); (iii) that it is committal about what is part of the imagined situation (cf. Martin (2002)); and (iv) that it differs from visual recall (cf. Martin (2001)). The main objection to the agency view, when applied to visualising, is that it faces certain counterexamples, notably unbidden images (e.g., hypnagogic images), pictorial experience (cf. Walton (1990) and Stock (2008)), and possibly dreams (cf. O'Shaughnessy (2002) and McGinn (2004)). Here, I will just note these counterexamples and elaborate on their initial plausibility. The discussion of scepticism about their status as counterexamples will be postponed until the discussion of the role of imagining in aesthetics (chapter 5) and the prospects of the agency view to provide a unified account of imagining (chapter 6), respectively.

After reading the chapter, students should understand:

- Which forms of imagining are examples of objectual imagining
- The main features of visualising
- The main differences between the five presented views on visualising
- The main reasons for and against endorsing each of these views
- The close connections of some of the views to particular theories of the mind
- Some of the historical links between the views

Recommended reading. Sartre (2004) provides a good description of some of the main features of visualising, as well as of the intentional view. Hume (2007) is the classical empiricist text on visualising and can be read as a proponent of either the perceptual or the experiential view — the latter also being illustrated by Martin (2002, 2001)'s neo-Humean account of visualising in experiential terms. Tye (1991) gives a nice historical overview of (apparent) endorsements of the pictorial view. Both the perceptual view and the pictorial view (despite not often explicitly endorsed) have been critisised at length by Sartre (2004), Ryle (2009, ch. 8) and Wittgenstein (1984). Hopkins (1998, ch. 7) and Noordhof (2002) argue against the experiential view. The agency view is most clearly spelled out in Scruton

(1974) and McGinn (2004), and rejected in O'Shaughnessy (2003). Hopkins (1998, ch. 7) and Martin (2002) discuss objectual imagining in other sense modalities. The link between representationalism and the pictorial view is discussed in Dorsch (2010b).

Chapter 3: Propositional imagining (about 13.000 words)

The third chapter will continue my consideration of question (a), this time applied to propositional forms of imagining. My discussion will parallel that of objectual imagining. As a consequence, many of the distinctions and points made in the last chapter will only be briefly rehearsed in this one. I will thereby concentrate on belief-like imagining, again primarily because of its prominence in the literature and because of its model character for other forms of propositional imagining. The main question concerning the nature of belief-like imagining is, anew, how it differs from its non-imaginative counterpart. The answer to this question should then allow the specification of the mental kind which its instances belong to. But I will note that it will also be of relevance to ask how imaginative thoughts differ from other kinds of non-judgemental thought, such as wondering whether something is the case, or merely thinking, entertaining or understanding a proposition. Whether there are other forms of propositional imagining over and above belief-like imagining (e.g., imaginative counterparts to conscious emotions or desires) will be discussed in the context of our responses to artworks (cf. chapter 5).

Before discussing the various possible approaches to belief-like imagining, I will note two fairly uncontroversial facts about belief-like imagining. The first is that there are no full-blown dispositional forms of propositional imagining, but only occurrent ones, plus personal preferences for imagining certain things rather than others (cf. Walton (1990) and Nichols (2004)). This has the not always acknowledged consequence that, strictly speaking, the non-imaginative counterparts of belief-like imagining are episodes of belief — that is, occurrent judgemental thoughts, rather than dispositional beliefs (McGinn (2004)). The second observation will be that the distinction between occurrent beliefs that occupy our attention (or are 'conscious' or 'noticed') and occurrent beliefs that are merely in the background of our minds applies also to belief-like imaginings (Walton (1990, ch.1)). For instance, in hypothetical reasoning (as much as in real reasoning), the premisses continue to be effective and 'in our minds', even after we have switched our attention to conclusions further down the line. Indeed, one hypothesis will be that cases seemingly suggestive of the presence of dispositional imaginings can be accounted for in terms of peripheral episodes of belief-like imagining.

'Supposing' vs. 'imagining'. My discussion of the nature of belief-like imagining begins with the presentation of the various attempts to distinguish two kinds of such propositional imagining, 'supposing' and 'imagining' something — notably in connection to the debate about 'imaginative resistance' (cf. chapter 5). What philosophers have claimed is, for instance, that 'imagining' (or 'conceiving', understood in a broad sense) differs from 'supposing' — either essentially or at least typically — in that it is more coarse (Weatherson (2004)), involves our

emotional participation, is perspectival (or 'self-involving'), allows for imaginative resistance (Gendler (2006) and Meskin and Weinberg (2006)), possesses a distinctive phenomenal character (Peacocke (1985)), plays a different epistemic role, may be done for non-epistemic purposes (Velleman (2000) and Meskin and Weinberg (2006)), involves embellishment, is subject to consistency and similar norms, is open to some kind of passive 'streaming' input (Meskin and Weinberg (2006)), is sensitive to empirical findings, and/or involves mental imagery (Byrne (2007)). What I will highlight is that these noted differences make most sense if they are understood in one of two ways (cf. Currie and Ravenscroft (2003)): as differences among distinct ways of utilising belief-like imagining in purposive imaginative projects (e.g., with the aim to establish a reductio argument vs. with the aim to daydream about being rich); or, alternatively, as differences between mere belief-like imagining and complex projects also involving objectual or experiential imagining (cf., for instance, the notion of 'imagining' in Weatherson (2004) and Kind (2011b)). Accordingly, my focus in what follows will be on the nature of episodes of belief-like imagining — instances of imagining that something is the case (cf. Walton (1990), Velleman (2000), Denham (2000), Currie and Ravenscroft (2003), and Meskin and Weinberg (2006)'s notion of 'considering') — independently of their purpose or mental context.

As in the case of visualising, the subsequent discussion will list the various accounts of belief-like imagining in relation to whether they take the difference between imaginative and judgmental thoughts to be quantitative or qualitative and, if the latter, whether they locate it in what is presented or in how it is presented. Because of their general implausibility, I will consider the options (1) and (2) only very briefly and focus on proposals related to option (3). I will thereby often refer back to the views on visualising in chapter 2, instead of explicating the corresponding views on belief-like imagining in much detail.

(1) The judgemental view: a difference in degree. The first view to be discussed is the judgemental view which claims that imaginative thoughts are of the same mental kind as belief- or knowledge-constituting thoughts and differ from the latter just in degree — for instance, in their impact on belief and action, or their involvement of a sense of reality. Again, the view is closely linked to an empiricist outlook and inherits all its difficulties. According to one reading of their work, Hume (2007) and O'Shaughnessy (2003) are proponents of this view. As above with the perceptual account of visualising, the main problem is that imaginative and judgemental thoughts show differences in kind. I will concentrate on the differences in functional role (e.g., how the thoughts interact with perception, belief and action), in commitment (e.g., concerning what is part of the actual world), and in the subjection to the will of what is presented (e.g., whether it is up to us which proposition to think of).

(2) The modal view: a difference in what is presented. The second view to be introduced is the modal view which maintains that, while judgemental thoughts are — in one sense or another — distinctively concerned with actualities, imaginative thoughts are concerned with possibilities (cf. Casey (2000) and White (1990)). I will list various possible readings of this claim (cf.

also below) and will briefly argue that this view should not be made more specific by locating the difference in the presented propositions — that is, the contrast is not that between imaginative thoughts about what is possible (i.e., having the content 'it is possible that p') and judgemental thoughts about what is actual (i.e., having the content 'it is actual that p').

(3.a) The intentional view: a difference in the attitude of awareness. As I will make clear, both the establishment of intentionalism as the orthodox view on the nature of our mental presentations and the implausibility of taking the difference between judgemental and imaginative thoughts to be a difference in degree or in what is presented have moved people to construe this difference as a difference in intentional attitude. Philosophers have tried to characterise the postulated imaginative attitude in different terms, and I will discuss the four most prominent proposals. Some of them just aim to describe the postulated attitudinal difference, while others attempt to explain it in more basic — and typically naturalistic — terms (e.g., in relation to a functionalist or teleological outlook on mental representation). What I will point out is that the basic problem facing the intentional view is to characterise the imaginative attitude in positive terms, rather than merely to say that it consists in the lack of, or is distinct from, the judgemental attitude. This negativity is problematic, first, because it leaves the nature of imaginative thought partly unilluminated and, second, because it may not be enough to distinguish imaginative thought from other kinds of non-judgemental thought (e.g., wondering about something, or having a guess; cf. Casey (2000)).

The modal view: a difference in actual/possible truth commitment. Because of the difficulties of locating the difference in the presented propositions (cf. above), proponents of the modal view should claim that the difference is located in the attitudes of the respective episodes: while judgemental thoughts endorse proposition (including modal propositions) as true in the actual world, imaginative thoughts endorse them as true in some possible world (which may in fact be, or perfectly correspond to, the actual world). (It might be necessary to say a bit about simple modal logic in order to illustrate how the actual truth of a modal proposition about what is possible is not the same as the possible truth of a (modal or non-modal) proposition.) One important consequence of this view is that belief-like imagining cannot easily ground actual modal knowledge — which may be a vice or a virtue, depending on where one stands in that debate (cf. chapter 4). Another potential objection to be highlighted is that it seems to be possible to imagine impossibly true propositions (cf. Meskin and Weinberg (2006)).

The fictional view: a difference in real/fictional truth commitment. The fictional view — to be briefly discussed as a direct alternative to, and possible improvement of, the modal view — addresses these objections by replacing the attitude of taking some proposition to be possibly true with the attitude of taking some proposition to be fictionally true. One of the key points to be discussed is how fictional worlds differ from possible worlds (e.g., in respect of their completeness and their consistency). (The concrete relationship to Walton's account of

fictionality, which involves the claim that imagining something locates it in a certain fictional world (Walton (1990, 37, especially n. 26, and 45), will be spelled out in chapter 5).

The functional view: a difference in functional role. The next intentionalist alternative to be considered is the functional view which is motivated by functionalist approaches to the mind, and which describes and explains the difference in attitude between imaginative and judgemental thoughts in terms of differences in their functional roles: while judgemental thoughts respond to perceptions and lead to belief and (normal) action, imaginative thoughts do not (despite the fact that both stand in the same rational patterns; cf. Currie and Ravenscroft (2003)). I will illustrate how the functional view rests on the assumption that the rational impact of propositional content is separate from the rational impact of attitude towards that content. This has the advantage that the functional view can explain the most significant similarity between imaginative and judgemental thought which, for instance, enables us to empathise or imagine being in the position of someone else (cf. Currie and Ravenscroft (2003)). But I will also ask whether it does not rest on a misleading picture of rationality in assuming that the rational impact of content can be so clearly separated from the impact of attitude. (A similar question arises in the debates about the difference between practical and theoretical reasoning.) Another problem to be highlighted is that the functional view has difficulties to provide a positive characterisation of the nature of belief-like imagining which goes beyond the claim that it is not sensitive to perception and does not give rise to belief and (normal) action.

The teleological view: a difference in aim. Another version of (3a) is the teleological view which claims that belief-like imagining is characterised by two features: (i) it involves the endorsement of a proposition as true; (ii) this endorsement does not have the aim to get to the truth, but some other function (cf. Velleman (2000)). I will begin my discussion of the teleological view by noting its similarities both to the precedings versions of the intentional view and to the agency view (cf. below), and by noting that it may also be formulated in normative terms. The main problem facing the teleological view is to spell out and defend the idea that judging and believing aim at truth in the required sense. In particular, it is not clear whether judgemental thoughts cannot be formed irrespective of their truth, or whether the postulated teleology (or normativity) should be located on the personal, on the subpersonal level, or on both (cf. Dorsch (2009)).

(3.b) The experiential view: an attitude in the immediacy of awareness. The next view that I will discuss locates the difference between imaginative and judgemental thoughts not in the attitude, but in the immediacy of awareness. Accordingly, the *experiential view* states that propositionally imagining something means literally imagining judging — or occurrently believing — it (cf. the experiential view about visualising). That is, belief-like imagining are not directed at propositions, but instead at attitudes towards propositions. Both Hume (2007) and O'Shaughnessy (2003) may be read as proponents of this version of (3b), which thus again

presents an alternative to (1) for empiricists. I will illustrate that the two main problems with this view are, first, that it lacks proper motivation (apart from more general reasons for an empiricist outlook); and, second, that belief-like imagining (in contrast, say, to visualising) does not seem to have the function to recreate aspects of the phenomenal character of its non-imaginative counterpart (cf. Currie and Ravenscroft (2003, 95)) — partly because it is controversial whether thoughts possess phenomenal characters in the first place, and partly because the main salient element shared by imaginative and judgemental thoughts (i.e., their propositional content) may also be shared by other episodes, such as emotions and possibly desires.

(3.c.) The agency view: a difference in the voluntariness of awareness. The final view to be dealt with is the agency view which, again, takes imagining to be an instance mental agency with considerable control over what is presented (cf. Scruton (1974), McGinn (2004) and Dorsch (2009, 2011)). First of all, I will stress that McGinn (2004)'s version of the agency view is unusual in that it identifies belief-like imagining already with the act of entertaining a proposition, that forms part of all propositional thought, including judgemental thought. His view raises several objections (cf. Walton (1990, ch. 1)), including the question of whether entertaining a proposition can really be both a self-standing episode and a dependent part of a more complex episode. More generally, I will note that the agency view about belief-like imagining is motivated by similar considerations, notably the subjection to the will of imaginative, but not of judgemental thoughts. Similarly, I will show that the agency view faces the same problem in both cases, namely to account for unbidden, non-judgemental thoughts, and perhaps also dream thoughts (cf. O'Shaughnessy (2002) and McGinn (2004)). In addition, it will be important to address the issue of doxastic voluntarism, given that its truth would undermine the agency view. And I will try to make clear that, apart from entertaining a proposition, the agency view may also have difficulties to distinguish belief-like imagining from other mental acts, such as wondering, guessing or merely thinking about something.

After reading the chapter, students should understand:

- The various distinctions between 'supposing' and 'imagining', and how they are linked to purposiveness or mental context
- The main features of episodic belief-like imagining
- The main differences between the presented views on belief-like imagining
- The main reasons for and against endorsing each of them

Recommended reading. Meskin and Weinberg (2006) provide a nice summary of the different possibilities of distinguishing 'supposing' from 'imagining' and note their link to mental activity. Currie and Ravenscroft (2003) describe many of the main features of belief-like imagining and, moreover, defend well the functionalist view. Hume (2007) and O'Shaughnessy (2003) are, again, the best examples of empiricist endorsements of either

the judgemental or the experiential view. Although not always being sufficiently clear on the details of their accounts, Casey (2000) and White (1990) are classical proponents of the modal view. Walton (1990) may be read as embracing the fictional view, while Velleman (2000) has applied teleological considerations to belief-like imagining. The agency view is, again, well presented by Scruton (1974) and McGinn (2004), and criticised by O'Shaughnessy (2003).

Chapter 4: Applications in epistemology (about 13.000 words)

With the fourth chapter, I will move on to question (b) of the significance of the imagination for particular philosophical debates. I will use this chapter to explain some of the main uses which the imagination has been put to in epistemology. My main focus will be on four areas of application: (i) perception and skepticism; (ii) the visual perception of hidden aspects; (iii) other minds; and (iv) knowledge about the world. I will outline the motivations and problems for each of these applications and will show how, in each of these cases, the respective debates illustrate the importance of getting a clearer picture of the nature and uses of the forms of imagining involved. The guiding idea is therefore that, without such a picture, the debates cannot be satisfactorily developed. Besides, I will stress that these cases show that imagining is not only important for our engagement with fictions (cf. the next chapter), but also for our interaction with reality.

Perception and skepticism. In this section, I will highlight the consequences of the experiential view of visualising for philosophical theories of perception and for the responses to Berkeley's idealist statement of *'esse est percipi'*. I will suggest that the fact that an account of visualising may have a bearing on theories of perception should not be surprising, given the close resemblance of seeing and visualising as instances of visual presentation. And I will make clear how, once it is accepted that at least some instances of visualising amount to imagining seeing, disjunctivist views of perceptual experience can better accommodate the commitment to what is visualised than standard intentionalist views (cf. Martin (2002) and Dorsch (2010b)). Whether the intentional or the experiential view is true of visualising thus has significant consequences for whether intentionalism or disjunctivism about perceptual experience is true. I will show that this result has also a bearing on certain responses (i.e., those maintaining that we can visualise an unexperienced tree) to Berkeley's claim that there cannot be an unperceived tree (cf. Peacocke (1985) and Martin (2002)).

Visual perception of hidden aspects. First of all, I will introduce two important and often noted facts about visual perception: we can see balls, buildings and other three-dimensional objects as being voluminous and as having backsides, without being sensorily aware of their backsides; and we can the shapes of objects, even if they are partly occluded. Then, I will outline how some philosophers have tried to account for these (and similar) facts in terms of the involvement of objectual or propositional imagining in seeing (cf. Sellars (1979) and Kind (2011a)).

Their main motivation for this attempt has been that visualising is both a form of visual presentation and a presentation of something not present. The main challenge facing their proposal is, however, to properly account for the phenomenologically salient fact that the hidden aspects are not given to us sensorily (i.e., they do not occupy regions of the visual field), despite being presented in an objectual and visual manner. As I will highlight, this seems to rule out both belief-like imagining and visualising as the needed element for the presentation of hidden aspects of objects (cf. Merleau-Ponty (2002) and Noe (2005)). Besides, our awareness of hidden aspects is not subject to the will and, hence, cannot involve imagining in its natural form. I will therefore consider also the alternative of imagining informing or penetrating perception and note the problem that, while our awareness of hidden aspects posits them as part of our actual environment, no form of imagining shows such a commitment.

Other minds. This section will discuss two topics: (i) whether, and how, imagining may help us to come to know about the state of mind of other people; and (ii) whether this way of acquiring knowledge is the canonical or most basic form of access to other minds (or whether it presupposes some more fundamental kind of access). I will begin by spelling out the difference between the two issues (i.e., between canonical and non-canonical sources of knowledge) and by relating them to two prominent debates in the literature: (i) the debate on the nature of empathy; and (ii) the debate between simulation theory and theory theory. I thereby will elucidate how empathy has been understood in terms of projective imagining and, more specifically, in terms of imaginative simulation (cf. Heal (2003), Gordon (1995) and Currie and Ravenscroft (2003)). And I will consider some of the main points in play in the debate between simulationists and 'theorists', notably whether the difference between simulation and theory is clear-cut, and which main points speak in favour of simulationism (e.g., phenomenological considerations, or considerations about autism; cf. Currie and Ravenscroft (2003)).

Knowledge about the world. My discussion of the role of imagining in the acquisition of knowledge about the world will start with the distinction between an enabling and a grounding role. For instance, when we come to know he number of windows in our house by imagining walking through it room by room, what provides us with evidence are our visual recollections of the windows (cf. Kosslyn (1980)). By contrast, when we come to know whether a rock would end up in the lake at the bottom of a slope, if it were to slide down the slope, by visualising its likely path, it is the episode of visualising the rock falling into the lake which provides us with our evidence (cf. Williamson (2008)).

Next, I will distinguish two kinds of knowledge which have been taken to be possibly grounded in imagining (cf. Byrne (2007)): (i) knowledge of what is metaphysically possible; (ii) contingent conditional knowledge (as in the rock example, or in Martin (2002)'s example of imagining turning a sofa upside down and pushing it through the door of one's living-room). In particular, I will point to the related distinction between 'it is a metaphysical possibility' and (the more vague) 'it is a real/actual possibility' (i.e., part of a close possible world).

Then, I will address the issue of which forms of imagining are good candidates for grounds of (i) or (ii). In the latter case, the answer will be fairly straightforward: imaginative projects involving objectual imagining. I will explain that this is related to the fact that the respective projects are meant to replace the effort of bringing one into the position to perceptually acquire the piece of knowledge concerned. The debate about imagination-based modal knowledge, on the other hand, is much more complex (cf. Gendler and Hawthorne (2002, especially the introduction)) and can only be sketched here. Recalling the discussion of the contrast between 'imagining' and 'supposing' in chapter 3, I will begin by pointing out that the kind of imagining (or 'conceiving') in question cannot simply be belief-like imagining, given that we can belief-like imagine what we know to be impossible (e.g., we can easily suppose that water is not H_2O; cf. Gendler and Hawthorne (2002, introduction) and Byrne (2007)). I will thereby note that this issue is distinct from the issue that imagining, as a guide to metaphysical possibility, is defeasible and may err; and point out the relevant connections to the modal view discussed in chapter 3. My discussion will continue with considering objectual imagining and 'modal imagining' as candidates for grounding modal knowledge (cf. Hart (1988) and *ChalmersConceivability*, respectively). As I will explain, the former faces the same problem as belief-like imagining, since we can objectually present metaphysical impossibilities (e.g., we can see or visualise an Escher-staircase); while the latter cannot be easily distinguished both from objectual imagining and from non-imaginative rational intution and, moreover, cannot easily accommodate the fact that only certain pieces of modal knowledge seem to be accessible apriori (cf. Kripke (1980) and Byrne (2007)). So perhaps the best option for grounding modal knowledge in imagining is to accept that (i) is largely empirical and can be handled in a similar way as (ii) (cf. Williamson (2008)).

To conclude, I will ask under which conditions imagining may be able to ground knowledge of type (i) or (ii). Again starting with the latter case, I will suggest that what matters is that the projective imagining concerned is successfully constrained by the aim to conform to the relevant conditions in the real world (e.g., that rocks are subject to forces of gravity and momentum) and is also correctly informed by our folk knowledge of these conditions (cf. Williamson (2008)). Moreover, the instances of objectual imagining involved have to be commital about what is part of the imagined world and, moreover, should be able to refer to real objects (cf. Martin (2002), and chapter 2). If modal knowledge is not treated in a similar way to contingent conditional knowledge, the main problem to be addressed is how the proposed 'modal imagining' can be reliable about what is metaphysically possible. In particular, I will note that the idea of requiring ideal rational reflection as a precondition on imagining (cf. Kripke (1980) and Chalmers (2002)) may at best help in cases of necessary truths (cf. Bealer (2002) and Sosa (2002)). In any case, given that imagining as such lacks a judgemental attitude and does not incline us to endorse it in belief (cf. chapters 2 and 3), our endorsement of it in modal belief has to be partly due to our assumption that it is reliable — for instance, as I will suggest, because we partly ensure its reliability by engaging in our imaginative project with the respective care and purpose.

After reading the chapter, students should understand:

- Which impact treating visualising as imagining seeing has on the philosophy of perception
- The main reasons for and against taking our perceptual awareness of hidden aspects of objects to involve imagining
- How simulationism explains our capacity for empathy in terms of projective imagining
- The main reasons for and against a simulationist approach to our knowledge of other minds
- The distinction between an enabling and a grounding role for imagining in knowledge acquisition
- Which kinds of imaginative project have been taken to ground modal or conditional knowledge, and why

Recommended reading. The classical argument against intentionalism about perception in terms of an experiential understanding of visualising has been formulated by Martin (2002). Peacocke (1985) is an important predecessor of this article and, moreover, the best discussion of the relevance of the experiential view for Berkeleyan skepticism. — Sellars (1979) and Kind (2011a) defend the view that our perception of hidden aspects involves imagining; while Merleau-Ponty (2002) and Noe (2005) criticise this view. — Goldie (2000, ch. 7) is a good introduction to empathy, and Davies and Stone (1995, introduction) to the debate between simulationists and theorists. Currie and Ravenscroft (2003) provide a clear statement and defence of a simulationist view, which is none the less sensitive to the unavoidable involvement of theory and to the issue of where best to draw the boundary between the two approaches to our knowledge of other minds. — Gendler and Hawthorne (2002, especially the introduction) and Byrne (2007) provide detailed overviews of the various approaches to modal knowledge and their difficulties; while Hart (1988), Chalmers (2002) and Williamson (2008) offer good defences of different imagination-based accounts of modal knowledge. Williamson (2008)also discusses contingent conditional knowledge, and Martin (2002) and Dorsch (2011) comment on the preconditions which visualising has to satisfy in order to be able to ground this kind of knowledge.

Chapter 5: Applications in aesthetics (about 13.000 words)

The fifth chapter will continue with the focus on question (b) and present some of the main debates in aesthetics that make essential reference to the imagination — namely the debates on: (i) fiction and our engagement with it; (ii) our experiences of pictures and ambiguous figures; (iii) our emotional and conative responses to fictions; (iv) 'imaginative resistance'; and (v) the expressiveness of abstract music. The reference to the imagination in the explanations of (i)-(iv) is generally motivated by the fact that the respective aesthetic experiences are concerned with the worlds represented by the artworks — and so with something that is not

present and often even unreal (cf. Sartre (2004)). In fact, this will be one of the main themes of this chapter: the structural similarity between the imagination and the phenomena at issue in respect of their concern with (what may be called) 'presence in absence'. Furthermore, I will render plausible the idea that something similar applies to (v), given that proponents of an imagination-based account of expressiveness treat the respective artworks as vehicles of imagined acts of expression, and given that the relation between vehicles of expression and what they express is (close to being) representational (i.e., the music is taken to be (quasi-)representational, after all; cf. Budd (1996)). One of the things to be highlighted in this chapter is the fact that most of the recent debates have been re-started — or at least greatly influenced — by the writings of Walton and Moran. During the course of the discussions of (i)-(v), I will therefore provide brief outlines of the main elements of their views.

Fiction and our basic engagement with them. Walton (1990)'s account of our engagement with fictions is central to most discussions of the role of the imagination in our aesthetic engagement with representational art; and it is therefore mandatory to provide a brief outline of his theory of how we appreciate representational artworks — notably the nature of norm-governed games of make-believe, the function of artworks as props in such games, our resulting imaginative participation, and his account of fictionality in terms of imagining. In particular, I will note the projective character of our imaginative engagement with art, as Walton describes it. I will also mention some of the main general objections to this picture (more specific ones will be addressed in the subsequent sections of this chapter). One important issue is, for instance, whether it is really possible to define fictions in terms of demands to imagine; and another what the nature of the proposed norms governing our games of make-believe might be.

Pictorial experience and seeing aspects. First of all, I will note that the debate about pictorial experience arises from the issue of how to account best for our visual awareness of what is depicted, given that what is depicted is absent from our environment, and given that our awareness of it is at least typically inseparable from our visual perception of the picture itself (cf. Wollheim (1990) and Hopkins (1998); 3D-holograms are possible exceptions). Apart from considerations about a more general theory of our engagement with representational art and the problems of alternative accounts (cf. Hopkins (1998)), the main reason for accounting for pictorial experience in terms of imagining is the visual character of our awareness combined with the absence of our object of awareness (cf. Husserl (2006)). I will then spell out Walton's account of pictorial experience in terms of the complex project of imagining of one's perception of the picture that it is a perception of what is depicted. On the side, I will note relevant differences to the similar accounts of Sartre (2004), Scruton (1974) and O'Shaughnessy (2003).

Part of my assessment of these accounts will be the observation that they face more or less the same difficulties as the postulation of an imaginative element in our perception of hidden

aspects of objects (cf. chapter 4): it is unclear which form of imagining could do the job and ensure a visual and unified experience of pictures (cf. Hopkins (1998)); and it is unclear how the general subjection to the will of imagining could be accommodated (cf. Dorsch (2011)). This will lead directly to the short discussion of an imagination-based account of our experience of noticing an aspect (cf. Scruton (1974) and Budd (1991)) which can avoid at least the second objection, given that noticing an aspect is to some extent subject to our voluntary control.

Emotional and conative responses to fictional stories. The relevant debates concentrate on two problems (cf. Levinson (1997) and Kind (2011b)): *the problem of engagement*: how it is possible that we have emotion- and desire-like responses to fictional characters, situations, and so on, although emotions and desires can only be directed at real entities (e.g., we 'fear' the monster in the movie, while genuine fear requires belief in the existence of what is feared); and *the problem of motivation*: how it is possible that our engagement with fictional stories can move us to perform actions in the real world (e.g., children start to bark because they pretend to be dogs — something they do not take to be real, but fictional). (I will discuss the relevance of desire-like imaginings for a third set of problems — namely the so-called problem(s) of 'imaginative resistance' — further below in this chapter.)

First of all, I will elucidate that, assuming that the replacement strategy (i.e., that our responses and actions are in fact concerned with the stories, props and artworks involved, rather than with the represented characters and situations) fails to work (cf. Walton (1994b) and Kind (2011b)), the main choice is between two views (which both accept the involvement of belief-like imaginings). The imaginative approach claims that our responses and motivations involve emotional or conative forms of imagining (cf. Walton (1990, 1994b) and Currie and Ravenscroft (2003), possibly also Velleman (2000)), while the non-imaginative approach takes the involved emotional or conative elements to be entirely non-imaginative (cf. Moran (1994), Kind (2011b) and Nichols and Stich (2003)).

My discussion of whether the postulation of emotion- or desire-like imaginings is specifically able, or needed, to solve the problem of engagement will focus on several facts presented in favour of the imaginative approach — such as the fact that the emotion- or desire-like episodes do not show the same normative constraints and functional roles as real emotions or desires and hence should be taken to be distinct (cf. Currie and Ravenscroft (2003)), or the fact that the *de re* character of the involved episodes is difficult to account for in terms of real emotions or desires, rather than emotion- or desire-like imaginings (cf. Egan and Doggett (2007)). I will explain that the reasons for adopting the imaginative approach in relation to the problem of motivation are slightly different (cf. Kind (2011b)). They are mainly concerned with the observation that our standard belief/desire-schema of action explanation cannot account for pretence behaviour in which the protagonists are immersed (cf. Ryle (2009, ch. 8), Velleman (2000), Currie and Ravenscroft (2003) and Egan and Doggett (2007)), or in which they let their actions be guided, not by beliefs, but by conventions about which behaviour leads to a certain kind of pretence behaviour (cf. Egan and Doggett (2007)). Besides, I will criti-

cally discuss the idea that the proper simulation of another person's emotions or desires has to involve emotion- or desire-like imagining (cf. Gordon (1986) and Currie and Ravenscroft (2003) for support, and Carruthers (2006), Nichols and Stich (2003) and Meskin and Weinberg (2006) for objections).

As I will illustrate, the objections raised against the imaginative approach are typically more general: they address the issue of whether there can really be emotional or conative imaginings. One objection is that the imaginative approach faces the challenge of explaining how our responses can involve real (rather than imagined) affective or conative elements as part of their phenomenal character, given that even imagining the occurrence of an emotion or desire can be dispassionate (cf. Moran (1994)). I will elucidate how the experiential view (cf. chapter 2) has the best chances to answer this challenge, since imagining feeling an emotion or desire would inherit some passionate or motivating character from the imagined experience (cf. Walton (1990, on 'imagining from the inside'), and Dorsch (2010a)). But it should also be highlighted that proponents of the imaginative approach usually tend to think of the emotional or conative imaginings in propositional rather than objectual terms (cf. Currie and Ravenscroft (2003), Velleman (2000) and Egan and Doggett (2007)). Two further prominent objections to be discussed are that emotion- or desire-like imaginings (in contrast to, say, belief-like imagining or visualising) do not figure in our folk psychology (e.g., we do not immediately recognise their occurrence; cf. Kind (2011b), and Currie and Ravenscroft (2003) for a reply), and that we hold people accountable for their responses to fictions and the resulting motivations — which suggests that the emotional or conative episodes involved are as real as our normal emotions or desires (cf. Moran (1994) and Kind (2011b)). Again, I will point out that the last objection does not take into account the possibility of experiential imaginings — that is, of episodes which are really affective or conative, but also consist just in the imagination of respective feelings (cf. Walton (1990) and Dorsch (2010a)).

'Imaginative resistance'. I will start off with separating two phenomena which have been discussed under the label 'imaginative resistance' (cf. Gendler (2000) and Weatherson (2004)): (i) our (possibly affective) rejection of authorial authority on what is fictionally true in a given story and hence — following Walton — on what we ought to imagine when engaging with the story (sometimes called the 'alethic' or the 'fictionality puzzle', or the 'problem of imaginative impropriety'); and (ii) our inability and/or unwillingness to imagine something, notably in a belief-like form and in response to what we take to be fictionally true in a given story (sometimes called the 'psychological' or the 'imaginative puzzle', or the 'problem of imaginative barriers'). During the course of my discussion of these two phenomena, I will briefly mention the historical background of the debates, notably the link to Hume (2008) and the influential role of Moran (1994). And I will also highlight our experience of shock or surprise which sometimes, but not always, accompanies (i) and/or (ii) (cf. Gendler (2006) and Weatherson (2004)), as well as the connection of especially (ii) to the issue of whether moral defects in a work have a bearing on its aesthetic value and on how we should engage with it (cf. Walton

(2006)).

Going more into the details, I will begin with noting that two closely related questions dominate the literature (cf. Walton (2006) and Gendler (2006)). On the one hand, it is debated which cases show which of the two phenomena. In particular, it is asked whether they are cases which show only (i) or, alternatively, only (ii); and it is asked whether there are cases which show both (i) and (ii) and, if so, which of the two is relevant for our failure to imaginatively engage with the respective artworks. On the other hand, questions are raised about how best to explain our rejection of authorial authority, or our inability and/or unwillingness to imagine something. In presenting the different answers given to these questions, I will highlight the close link between stressing the inability or the unwillingness aspect of (ii) and one's stance on the occurrence and significance of (i): philosophers who tend to take (i) to be effective in our failure to imagine something understand it as giving rise to (ii) in the form of an unwillingness to engage in an imaginative project which strikes the subject as wrong (cf. Gendler (2000, 2006) and Currie and Ravenscroft (2003)); while philosophers who take only (ii) to be central to (certain) cases tend to read (ii) as an inability to imagine something, due to some kind of incoherence in what the subject is supposed to imagine (cf. Walton (1994b) and Weatherson (2004)). My discussion of how certain concrete examples should be interpreted is also meant to reveal which specific conditions have to hold to give to rise to (i) or (ii) (e.g., which demands on the imagining subject have to hold, or which kinds of incoherence may become relevant; cf. Meskin and Weinberg (2006)).

One conclusion that I will stress is that (ii) is not restricted to aesthetic cases, and also not to cases involving moral issues (cf. Walton (2006)), although such cases manifest (ii) perhaps most clearly (cf. Gendler (2006)); another that (i) is more concerned with our acceptance of something as fictional than with our subsequent imaginative engagement (cf. Walton (2006)) — which may explain why the two sets of philosophers have had different views on the significance of (i). A further important observation will be that both (i) and (ii) occur only in limited form (if at all) if solely belief-like imagining (or 'supposition') is concerned; their full manifestation requires more complex and subject-involving imaginative projects (cf. Moran (1994) and Gendler (2000)). A final important point to be noted will be that (i) and (ii) arise only because of a conflict between what we are supposed to imagine and our non-imaginative evaluations and capacities — stressing again the relevance of imagining for our real lives (cf. Moran (1994) and Gendler (2006)).

Expressiveness. I will begin my discussion of the expressiveness of abstract music with explaining why philosophers have taken it to be problematic: (i) such music is expressive (i.e., we experience it as expressive); (ii) there are no obvious candidates for an expressing subject, an expressed emotion or and an act of expression; (iii) but expressiveness requires an expressing subject, an expressed emotion and an act of expression (cf. Levinson (1996)). Then, I will briefly spell out the motivation for accounting for the expressiveness of music in terms of imagined (rather than real) subjects, emotions and acts of expression. One is that alternative

accounts (e.g., in terms of resemblance, arousal, projection or metaphor) face their own problems; and another that it is easier to make sense of imagined expression than to make sense of experienced expressiveness without expression (cf. Levinson (1996) and Budd (1996)).

After that, I will list five different — but compatible — proposals about how imagining may play a central role in our experience of the expressiveness of music: (i) we may imagine music as expressive of emotions which we imagine ourselves as feeling (cf. Walton (1988) and Budd (1996)), and we may thereby imaginatively identify with the music (Trivedi (2001)); (ii) we may imagine music as expressive of the emotions of a certain type of person (i.e., a 'musical persona'; cf. Levinson (1996) and, to some extent, Walton (1988)); (iii) we may imagine music as expressive of its own emotions and thereby imagine it as animate and as (part of) a person (cf. Trivedi (2001)); (iv) we may imagine music as expressive of the emotions of some completely unspecifed persons; (v) or we may imagine music as expressive of impersonal emotions (i.e., emotions which do not belong to any person; cf. Budd (1996)).

I will close with presenting some of the main objections against these proposals: that imagining something cannot give rise to real — and not merely imagined — expressiveness (cf. Wollheim (1990)); that it is unclear which form of imagining might be involved — especially since our experiences of expressiveness are objectual and not even in principle subject to the will (cf. Dorsch (2011)); that we are less involved than (i) suggests (cf. Levinson (1996)); that expression is always expression of a specific person (contra (ii), (iv) and (v); cf. Trivedi (2001)); and that we cannot imagine the impossible identity between the music and a certain person (contra (i) and (iii); cf. Velleman (2006, ch. 8) and the respective discussion in chapter 1).

After reading the chapter, students should understand:

- The basic elements of Walton's account of our engagement with representational art
- The objections to his idea that pictorial experience is essentially imaginative
- The philosophical problem posed by our affective and conative responses to fictions
- The reasons for and against the existence of emotion- and desire-like imaginings
- The different types of 'imaginative resistance' and how they might be explained
- The philosophical problem posed by musical expression

Recommended reading. Most of the discussions of the role of the imagination in our engagement with fiction start with, and have been influenced by, the writings of Walton (1988, 1990, 1994a,b) and Moran (1994). — Apart from Walton (1990), the most interesting imagination-based accounts of pictorial experience are phenomenological in nature: Husserl (2006) and Sartre (2004). Hopkins (1998, ch. 7) summaries the criticism of the imagination-based approach; while the much more sympathetic Scruton (1974) links the issue nicely with a discussion of aspect seeing. — Levinson (1997) gives a detailed overview of the problem of our emotional responses to fictions. While Walton (1990, 1997) defends emotion-like imaginings which are not emotions, Moran (1994) opposes this view. With respect to desire-like imaginings, Currie and Ravenscroft (2003) and Egan and Doggett

(2007) argue for their existence in different ways, while Carruthers (2006) and Kind (2011a) present good objections to this claim. — Moran (1994) and Gendler (2000) started the recent debate on 'imaginative resistance', while Weatherson (2004) and the texts in Nichols (2006, section III) offer nice discussions of the different phenomena concerned and the various philosophical positions taken. More specifically, Currie and Ravenscroft (2003) defend an account in terms of desire-like imagining, Meskin and Weinberg (2006) in terms of the cognitive architecture of propositional imagining, while Walton (2006) questions whether there is really something 'puzzling' about the experiences at issue. Hume (2008) and the detailed interpretation of his writings in Gendler (2006) provide the historical background for the debate. — Levinson (1996) and Budd (1996) are the best introduction to the debate about musical expressiveness; and Walton (1988, 1994a), Trivedi (2001) and Budd (1996) provide well-developed accounts of its involvement of imagining.

Chapter 6: The unity of imagining (about 7.000 words)

The sixth chapter — the shortest of all — will deal with the question of unity (c), that is, the issue of what unifies the various forms of imagining. My main concern will be with the hypothesis that the agency view captures best the general nature of imagining: all — and only — episodic and projective forms of imagining are instances of a certain kind of mental agency, namely mental agency aimed at the voluntary presentation of specific objects, features or states of affairs (cf. Dorsch (2009, 2011)). It will become clear that this view actually treats episodic and projective forms of imagining on a continuum: episodes of imagining are, in some sense, the most basic imaginative projects possible.

The first step in my defense of this view will be to explain the general motivation behind the attempt to look for unity among the various forms of imagining — that is, to try to identify the fundamental mental kind which all instances of imagining belong to. Three points are of special importance here (cf. Dorsch (2011)). First, we ordinarily classify the various forms of imagining as being of one and the same kind, namely imagining. Second, the different attempts at identifying the nature of particular forms of imagining (e.g., visualising, or belief-like imagining) lead naturally to unified views which adopt the same approach to each case. And, third, it can best explain the fact that the different forms of imagining share important features — notably their subjection to the will, their lack of functional connection to perception, belief and action, and their phenomenologically salient commitment towards the imagined situation.

Next, I will highlight some of the motivations for adopting the agency view, rather than another unified account of imagining. One important reason is that all the main possible alternatives are implausible. Building on the results of the chapters 2 and 3, I will, in particular, argue that the experiential view — while capturing the lack of immediacy involved in visualising — cannot be applied to propositional imaginings (i.e., belief-like imagining is distinct from imagining judging or believing); and that the difference between seeing and visualising cannot be construed simply in terms of a difference in attitude, although judgemental and imaginative

thoughts clearly differ in atttiude. One particular important point will be that the fact that all forms of imagining lack an intrinsic role in the acquisition of knowledge about, and the interaction with, the world (e.g., stressed by Wittgenstein (1984), Sartre (2004) and O'Shaughnessy (2003)) is a consequence of the voluntariness of imagining, rather than responsible for the latter.

Another important reason for endorsing the agency view as a unified account of imagining is that it can explain the other distinctive features of imagining — notably that its subjection to the will is intrinsic to it (cf. chapter 2), but also (as just mentioned) that imagining lacks an intrinsic role in our epistemic and practical engagement with reality, that it none the less may acquire the power to ground knowledge due to extrinsic factors (cf. chapter 4), and that it commits us to certain elements of the imagined worlds (cf. Martin (2002)). As I will illustrate, the centrality of the subjection to the will is reflected in its importance for the various applications of imagining discussed in the two preceding chapters — either because it casts doubt on the claim that imagining is involved in certain phenomena (e.g., our experiences of hidden aspects, pictures or musical expression), or because it enables certain phenomena (e.g., the imaginative acquition of modal or factual knowledge, or of knowledge about other minds).

Finally, I will address some of the objections raised against the agency view (cf. chapters 2 and 3). More specifically, I will argue that spontaneous images and thoughts are — mainly because of their fleeting character — best understood, not as instances of imagining, but as providers of material for imagining (cf. Dorsch (2010c) and Dorsch (2011)); that doxastic voluntarism is false (cf. Dorsch (2009)); that there are no cases of non-presentational imaginings (e.g., the counterpart to non-presentational moods are imaginative re-presentations of such moods); that compulsive imaginings, which in some sense resist our control, should be understood as obsessive actions; that dream consciousness is of a very different kind than waking consciousness and, hence, does not involve the same kind of mental episodes; and that especially objectual and projective forms of imagining still allow for the influence of epistemic, associative and other non-agential factors (cf. Dorsch (2011)).

After reading the chapter, students should understand:

- The motivation behind the search for a unified account of imagining
- The reasons why the experiential view and the intentional view cannot be generalised to all forms of imagining
- The explanatory power of the agency view, in particular in respect of the continuity in between episodic and projective imagining
- The main objections to the agency view

Recommended reading. Following Wittgenstein (1984), the agency view has been defended by Scruton (1974) and McGinn (2004), who apply it to both objectual and propositional imagining. Walton (1990) and O'Shaughnessy (2003) offer strong considerations against the view. Currie and Ravenscroft (2003) discuss the possibility of a unified account in terms

of the functional role of imagining in simulation, but fall short of fully endorsing it in the case of objectual imagining. Casey (2000) and White (1990) contain the ingredients for a unified account in modal terms, but do not spell it out. The idea that what characterises imagining is its intrinsic lack of a cognitive role can already be found in Wittgenstein (1984) and Sartre (2004), but is not linked there to the related subjection of imagining to the will.

Conclusion (about 4.000 words)

In the concluding paragraphs, I will summarise some of the main results of the book and point to certain interesting issues for future investigations. First of all, I will recall that the difference between episodes of imagining and their non-imaginative counterparts should better not be understood as a difference in degree, or a difference in what is presented. Relatedly, certain strict versions of empiricism or representationalism are bound to fail precisely because they cannot accommodate imaginative episodes. Then, I will compare the intentional and the experiential view as alternative accounts of how imaginative episodes become presentational and why they count as visual, belief-like, and so on. My conclusion will be that the respective considerations suggest that, while visualising is best taken to be an instance of imagining seeing, imaginative thought is to be characterised in intentional terms. I will mention how this seems to reflect the strict distinction between sensory and relational perception and non-sensory and non-relational thought, as well as the position of objectual imagining in between the two. This fits well with a further tentative conclusion to be drawn from the preceding chapters, namely that the postulation of emotion- and desire-like imaginings — which equally seem to be located in between perception and thought — is fairly unproblematic only if they are understood as imaginings of emotional or conative feelings.

I will continue by reminding the reader of the fact that the choice of the agency view as a unified theory of imagining is independent of whether the presentational character of each of the various forms of imagining is accounted for in intentional or experiential terms. This offers the option of preserving elements from all three approaches. Next, I will point out that taking imagining to be a form of mental agency can also help to explain why it may be utilised in epistemic contexts. In contrast to perception, which is constrained by the world, imagining needs to be constrained by us if it is supposed to deliver reliable information; and we can do so only by deliberate control of how we go about imagining the respective things. And I will close my summary with highlighting again the fact that paying attention to the imagination can be very rewarding with respect to the development of philosophical debates about other phenomena, whether they are concerned with reality (as in the case of perception) or with fictional worlds (as in the case of our engagement with representational art). That is, the imagination is an interesting subject of study, not only for its own sake, but also for the sake of other philosophical topics.

My outlook on the future of the philosophy of the imagination will mainly focus on the identification of some topics worthwhile of further investigation. Among them is the investigation of the consequences of endorsing a particular unified account — such as an agency

view with intentional and experiential elements — for the explanation of important features of imagining (e.g., its perspectivalness, its immunity to error through misidentification, or its introspective knowability) and for a wider picture of how the mind works. It will also be important for philosophy to spend more time on the four other aspects of imagining noted at the beginning and only sporadically mentioned in this book — that is, how conscious imagining and its various utilisations are realised on the subpersonal level; whether they are linked to a specific mental faculty or capacity; whether they are central to the imaginativeness of people, artworks, and so on; and to which extent dreaming is an instance of imagining. Finally, empirical research will be highly relevant for some of the ommited issues — and much more so than for many of the more abstract and philosophical issues discussed in this book. For instance, it will be worthwhile to see whether it is possible to find distinctive commonalities between the realisations of objectual, propositional and projective imagining. But it will also be of interest to try to use empirical findings to get clearer about more detailed aspects of the imagination, such as our inability to imagine certain things, or the (seeming) reliability of our imaginative projects which are aimed at the preservation and acquisition of knowledge.

4 Competing books

Generally, there are not many books with a primary concern for the imagination — at least not within analytic philosophy. Of the few published in the last fifty years or so, only some are introductory or involve introductory chapters. And some of the latter are out of date with contemporary research, focus only on historical texts prior to the second half of the last century, and/or are author-centred rather than systematic in their approach. Cocking (1991), Warnock (1976), Kearney (1994), Brann (1991) and Beaney (2005) fall into one or more of these categories. In particular, Beaney (2005), which is meant to serve as an introductory text as part of a course at the Open University, follows mainly the history of philosophy and is in many respects too basic as an introduction for advanced undergraduate or graduate students. The book proposed here is meant to fill this gap and provide a contemporary, systematic and advanced introduction to the main issues in the philosophy of the imagination.

Apart from the books just mentioned, the most important English-language monographs on the imagination published in the last half of a century are Furlong (1961), Casey (2000), White (1990), Currie and Ravenscroft (2003), McGinn (2004). Scruton (1974) and O'Shaughnessy (2003) are also significant since they present sophisticated accounts of imagining, despite devoting only a couple of chapters to the topic. Walton (1990) has much to say about imagining, but does not attempt to offer a theory of imagining. Besides, a couple of monographs are in the making — including Dorsch (2011) and a monograph on imagination and fiction by Kathleen Stock. But with the exception of White (1990) and, to some extent, McGinn (2004), none of these books introduces the reader to the debates on the imagination. White (1990) is a bit dated in its linguistic approach and, again, primarily focussed on historical texts in its introductory passages. McGinn (2004) perhaps comes closest to a systematic introduction to

the contemporary philosophy of the imagination. But it still is too opinionated for that purpose and does not cover all the ground that an introductory book should cover (it is also not intended as an introduction).

There are a couple of good collections with texts on the imagination, notably Beakley and Ludlow (2006), Block (1981), Kieran and Lopes (2003), Nichols (2006) and Hjort and Laver (1997). But they provide only short overviews of the debates covered by the included papers and, moreover, are limited to certain aspects of the imagination — such as the imagery debate, propositional imagining, or the role of imagining in certain types of aesthetic experience. Together with Rob Hopkins, I'm in the process of preparing a collection of classical texts on the imagination from Husserl up to today, which is in part meant to supplement the introductory book proposed here. Indeed, both the book and the collection are likely to be structured in very similar ways, with sections on objectual and propositional imagining, as well as on the different philosophical uses of the imagination. This will allow teachers to use them both together in classes for graduate or advanced undergraduates students on the topic of the imagination.

5 Relation to my own work

In addition to the forthcoming monograph on the unity of imagining (cf. Dorsch (2011)) and the planned collection of classical texts on the imagination, I am preparing a short monograph defending the agency view of imagining and have already published articles on belief-like imagining, on visualising, and on emotion-like imagining (cf. Dorsch (2009, 2010b,a)). I am also currently finishing a couple of drafts on pictorial experience, on imagining as a source of knowledge, and on Hume and the experiential approach to imagining (cf. my research website at www.ideengeschichten.de/research.html).

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